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Poorer, hotter countries are more vulnerable to climate change and will experiencemore negative impacts. The pat-
tern of vulnerability between countries is used to impute impacts for income deciles within countries, for adminis-
trative regions, and for grid cells. Almost three-quarters of people will face worse impacts than their country aver-
age. Between-country variation is larger than within-country variation for income deciles and regions, and about as
large for grid cells. I here revisit earlier estimates of the economic impact of climate change and extend the analysis
to impute the distribution of impacts within countries.
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Introduction
Poorer countries are more vulnerable to climate
change. This qualitative insight has long been
around,1 but quantification has lagged as estimat-
ing the impacts of climate change is difficult. I here
revisit earlier estimates of the economic impact of
climate change2 and extend the analysis to impute
the distribution of impacts within countries.
Estimates of the economic impact of climate
change are important because they form the basis
for estimates of the benefits of climate policy and, in
the form of the social costs of carbon, directly com-
pare to the costs of greenhouse gas emission reduc-
tion. The distribution of those impacts between and
within countries matters because the global total
impact and the social cost of carbon are sensitive
to its distribution3–6—unless one assumes that util-
ity is linear in consumption7 or that impacts of cli-
mate change will be compensated.8 Furthermore,
high and low impacts are not random, but rather
depend on fundamental factors at least some of
which are partially malleable by policy.9 The distri-
bution of impacts between countries informs inter-
national climate negotiations, especially on the dis-
cussion around loss and damage and the implied
historical responsibility and liability. It should also
guide the allocation of themonies in the Adaptation
Fund and other international development assis-
tance. The distribution of impacts within countries
informs the targeting of national adaptation projects
and other policy interventions to reduce vulnerabil-
ity to climate change.
While a greater resolution of the estimates of the
economic impacts of climate change is welcome for
the reasons given above,more detail does not equate
to higher accuracy. Some things average out on a
national or continental scale, and therefore do not
matter at that resolution. When models calibrated
at a coarse resolution are used to impute numbers at
a fine resolution (as is done below), things that are
irrelevant at the coarse resolution are also assumed
to be irrelevant at the fine resolution.One example is
the particular vulnerability of the coast to sea-level
rise and tropical storms.10 Food producers and con-
sumers are differently affected by impacts on crops.
Another example is the special position of cities and
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Figure 1. The global total annual impact of climate change over time. Primary estimates are shown as dots. The central, solid
line is the Bayesianmodel average, and the dashed line is the 90% confidence interval. For reference, the observed 30-year average
temperature (1900–2018) and the projected temperature (2019–2200, RCP8.5) are shown on the right axis.
the synergy between global warming and the urban
heat island effect.11 The downscaled estimates dis-
cussed below should therefore not be taken at face
value. Rather, these estimates are used to demon-
strate that resolution matters and to encourage fur-
ther economic research at a finer scale.
The paper proceeds as follows. The section “The
total impact of climate change” revisits estimates of
the economic impact of climate change. This mate-
rial is not original but needed to understand what
follows. Section “Distribution of impacts” presents
new estimates of the economic impact of climate
change per country2,12 and per incomedecile,13 and,
for the first time, estimates of the impact per subna-
tional region and for grid cells. Section “Measures
of inequality” shows measures of inequality.
The total impact of climate change
Figure 1 plots 26 of the 27 published estimates of
the total economic impact of climate change.a The
horizontal axis is calendar year. The vertical axis is
aOne estimate is for the impact of global cooling, not
shown on the graph.
the welfare equivalent income change, or Hicksian
equivalent variation. These numbers should be read
as follows: a global warming of 2.5 ◦C would make
the average person feel as if she had lost 1.3% of
her income, and 1.3% is the average of the 11 dots
at 2075.
Methods
The estimates in Figure 1 use a range of methods.
In the enumerative method, researchers take esti-
mates of the many impacts of climate change for all
parts of the world in their natural units from the rel-
evant literature, estimate the values of these impacts
(using either market prices or monetary valuation
methods), multiply the quantities and prices, and
add everything up.14–26 The result is an estimate
of the direct cost—price times quantity—of climate
change. The direct cost is a poor approximation
of the change in welfare, for instance, because it
ignores price changes, but it is an approximation
nonetheless. The enumerative approach omits inter-
actions between sectors, such as changes in water
resources affecting agriculture.
Other studies use the same physical impact
estimates as the enumerative studies above, but
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as shocks to a computable general equilibrium
model.27,28 These estimates include both price
changes and interactions between economics sec-
tors, be it through output, intermediate or input
markets, and between economies through interna-
tional trade and investment. The typical welfare
measure used in these studies is theHicksian Equiv-
alent Variation, an exact welfare measure. Com-
putable general equilibrium models are based on
the national accounts, and thus misrepresent sub-
sistence agriculture and omit direct impacts on wel-
fare, such as on health or nature.
Yet, other studies regress an economic indica-
tor on climate.29,30 Agricultural land prices, for
instance, reflect the productivity of the land and
hence the value of the climate that allows plants
to grow.31 Price differences due to climate varia-
tion are used to estimate the direct cost of climate
change. Household expenditure32 and self-reported
happiness33,34 have also been used. Themain advan-
tage of the Ricardian method is that it is based on
actual, rather than modeled behavior. The main
disadvantage is that climate variations over space
are used to derive the impact of climate change over
time. Space and time are different things.
One estimate elicits expert views.35 The studywas
done before anyone could reasonably claim exper-
tise on the economic impacts of climate change.
Views were expressed about the impact of climate
change on global output, which can be interpreted
as a measure of economic activity (but not welfare)
as well as a measure of income (and thus welfare).
Weather and climate
Climate, the 30-year average of weather, varies only
slowly over time. In Ricardian studies, the impact
of climate is identified from cross-sectional varia-
tion. However, many other things vary over space
too. Panel data help unless confounders do not
change much over time. To overcome this prob-
lem, a number of papers estimate the impacts of
weather on a range of economic indicators.36–40
From an economic perspective, weather is random
and its impact therefore properly identified. Unfor-
tunately, the impact of a weather shock is not the
same as the impact of climate change.41 See Refs.
42 and 43 for the rather restrictive conditions under
which weather variability is informative about cli-
mate change. Particularly, weather studies estimate
the short-run response of the economy, whereas the
interest is in the long-run response, with adjust-
ments in capital, behavior, and technology. Extrap-
olating the impact of weather shocks will not lead to
credible estimates of the impact of climate change.
Combining estimates
Besides the primary estimates, Figure 1 also shows a
curve. Seven alternative impact functions, proposed
in the literature, were fitted to the data. The curve
shown is the Bayesian model average, that is, the
seven impact functions are weighted according to
their fit to the primary estimates. The 90% confi-
dence interval shown is based on the uncertainty
reported in 7 of the 27 primary estimates. Using
the combined forecast error would imply a confi-
dence and symmetry that is not there. See Ref. 12
for details.
Results
Figure 1 contains many messages, extensively dis-
cussed elsewhere2 (Refs. 44 and 45 offer different
reviews of the same literature). First of all, there are
only 27 estimates, a thin empirical basis; and there
are only two estimates beyond 3.2 ◦C of warming.
For years 1850 to 2018, the temperature shown in
Figure 1 is the 30-year running mean. For 2019–
2200, the temperature roughly follows the RCP8.5
scenario so that the two estimates for high warm-
ing can be shown. The return to coal assumed in
RCP8.5 is now considered unlikely.46,47
Figure 1 shows that initial warming may be posi-
tive on net, while further warmingwould lead to net
damages. The initial benefits, due to reduced costs
of heating in winter, reduced cold-related mortality
and morbidity, and carbon dioxide fertilization, are
mostly in the past. For future warming, the negative
impacts dominate, such as summer cooling costs,
infectious diseases, and sea-level rise.
There are 11 estimates for 2.5 ◦C.Researchers dis-
agree on the sign of the net impact, but agree on the
order ofmagnitude: thewelfare loss (or gain) caused
by climate change is equivalent to the welfare loss
caused by an income drop of a few percent—a cen-
tury of climate change is about as bad as losing a year
of economic growth.
The uncertainty is rather large, however. The
error bars are probably an underestimate of the
true uncertainty, as experts tend to be overconfident
and estimates are incomplete. Climate economists
also know each other well. The uncertainty is right-
skewed. Negative surprises are more likely than
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positive surprises of similar magnitude. Adding risk
aversion, we may argue that a century of climate
change is no worse than losing a decade of eco-
nomic growth.
Distribution of impacts
Figure 1 shows the global average impact of climate
change, a metric useless for most purposes. Below, I
discuss impact estimates with more granularity.
Countries
Thirteen of the 27 studies include estimates of the
continental impacts of climate change or, in the stud-
ies involving DavidMaddison, national impact esti-
mates. Regressing the estimated continental impact
for 2.5 ◦C warming on per capita income and aver-
age annual temperature, with dummies αs for the
studies, yields
Ic = αs + 1.68(0.79) ln yc − 0.45(0.14)Tc;
N = 387;R2ad j = 0.20; F14,372 = 7.91 (1)
where Ic is the impact in country c (in %GDP),
yc is its average income (in 2010 market exchange
dollars per person per year), and Tc is the aver-
age annual temperature (in degrees Celsius). Hot-
ter countries have more negative impacts. Richer
countries have more positive impacts. Equation (1)
does not capture the special vulnerability of delta
and island nations, and it assumes that vulnerabil-
ity can be proxied by income and temperature. For
each of the studies, this equation is used to impute
national impacts, making sure that the continen-
tal or global totals match those in the original esti-
mates. The function shown in Figure 1 is then used
to shift all impacts to 2.5 ◦C warming.b For each
country, the average and standard deviation across
studies is taken.
Figure 2 shows results for individual countries for
2.5 ◦C warming. Hotter, poorer countries see more
negative impacts. In fact, the majority of countries
show a negative impact even though the global aver-
age impact is roughly zero. This is because the world
economy is concentrated in a few, rich countries.
The world average counts dollars, rather than coun-
tries, let alone people.
bNote that I use the global function to shift the imputed
national impacts. Ref.12 shows that this is more robust
than estimating national impact functions.
Poorer countries are more vulnerable to climate
change for three reasons. First, poorer countries
have a higher share of their economic activity in sec-
tors, such as agriculture, which are directly exposed
to the vagaries of weather. Second, poorer countries
tend to be in hotter places. This makes adaptation
more difficult as there are no analogs for human
behavior and technology. Cities in temperate cli-
mates need to look at subtropical cities to discover
how to cope in a warmer climate, and subtropical
cities at tropical ones. The hottest cities will need
to invent, from scratch, how to deal with greater
heat. Third, poorer countries tend to have a limited
adaptive capacity.48,49 Adaptive capacity depends on
a range of factors, such as the availability of tech-
nology, the ability to pay for those technologies, the
political will to mobilize resources for the public
good, and the government’s competence in raising
funds and delivering projects. All these factors are
worse in developing countries.
Some impacts of climate change may be felt more
keenly in richer countries, impacts on nature being
the prime example. The impact studies surveyed
above suggest that such impacts are relatively small,
so that the overall income elasticity of vulnerability
to climate change is indeed negative.
Income classes
Figure 2 shows that poorer countries are more vul-
nerable to climate change. Aggregating results by
country hides information. If poorer countries are
more vulnerable, then poorer people should also
be more vulnerable than richer people in the same
country. Poorer people are more likely to work out-
doors, their health is worse, and they are less likely
to have heating and air conditioning. The provision
of public goods, including coastal protection and
irrigation, also tends to be slanted toward the better
off. The pattern of vulnerability between countries
is therefore likely to be repeated within countries.
As there is no evidence on the pattern of vulnera-
bility to climate change within countries, I assume
that the pattern within countries is identical to the
pattern between countries.
Figure 3 again shows the impact of 2.5 ◦C warm-
ing. The impacts are further downscaled, to income
deciles, based on data from the University of Texas
Inequality Project, using the same semielasticity
used to downscale continental to national impact
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Figure 2. The economic impact of climate change for a 2.5 ◦C warming for countries as a function of their income (top panel)
and temperature (bottompanel). The central estimate is the average across studies, the error bar is one standard deviation between
studies.
estimates; see Eq. (1). Specifically, assume that the
impact Ic,p on income class p in country c equals
Ic,p = αc + β ln yc,p + γTc (2)
National impact then equals
Ic =
∑
p
Ic,pyc,pPc,p
yc,pPc,p
(3)
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Figure 3. The annual impact of 2.5 ◦C global warming by income decile compared with the country average impact.
We know Ic so that
αc = Ic − γTc − β
∑
p yc,p ln yc,p∑
p yc,p
(4)
Note that Eq. (2) is not estimated; it is used for impu-
tation.
Figure 3 plots the impact by decile against the
impact per country. By comparison, it also plots
country impact against country impact; this is the
samedata as shown in Figure 2.Most incomedeciles
show an impact that is worse than the country aver-
age. This is because the average counts dollars rather
than people, and the income distribution is skewed.
For the world as a whole, 72.6% of people are pro-
jected to incur worse impacts then their country
average. This number is higher in countries with a
more skewed income distribution.
Regions
The data on income distribution do not have geo-
graphic coordinates. Therefore, the estimate of the
impact of climate change by income decile assumes
that rich and poor people in the same country share
the same climate. This is not likely. Most countries
show distinct regional patterns of development, and
larger countries span different climate zones. The
reasons why poorer countries are more vulnera-
ble to climate change than richer countries, and
poorer people more vulnerable than richer people
also apply to poorer regions within countries. If
such regions tend to be hotter already, as suggested
by Refs. 30, 50, and 40, then they are evenmore vul-
nerable to climate change.
The Global Data Lab has data on per capita
income for subnational administrative units,51 that
is, provinces, states, or the local equivalent. I refer
to these units as regions. I used their shape files
to compute the average temperature for the period
1981–2010 from the gridded Climate Research Unit
data.52,c
Figure 4 repeats Figure 2, plotting the impact of
2.5 ◦Cwarming against current income and temper-
ature. The pattern is the same as before, because the
assumptions are the same as above. Poorer regions
are more vulnerable to climate change, as are hotter
regions. As some regions are poorer, richer, hotter,
or colder than their country average, the pattern in
Figure 4 ismore pronounced: the lows are lower and
the highs are higher.
cThe MATLAB code is on GitHub.
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Figure 4. The economic impact of climate change for a 2.5 ◦C warming for all states or provinces as a function of their income
(top panel) and temperature (bottom panel).
Grid cells
The regional impact estimates above use regional
average temperatures, computed from gridded tem-
peratures. That is, the above estimates assume that
everyone in a province or state shares the same cli-
mate. This is a reasonable approximation for small
regions, but not for big ones. I therefore downscale
the estimates further, to the 0.5 × 0.5◦ grid at which
temperature and population numbers are reported.
Specifically, I assume that everyone in a grid cell
7Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. xxxx (2020) 1–13 © 2020 The Authors. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences published by Wiley Periodicals LLC
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Figure 5. The economic impact (% income) of climate change for a 2.5 ◦C warming per grid cell.
within a region has the same income.d The impact
per capita follows from Eq. (1). I use the 0.5 × 0.5◦
Gridded Population of the World data to compute
the total impact per country, and shift the gridded
impact to match the national impact above.
Figure 5 shows the results for the impact of
2.5 ◦C global warming on the current economy. The
pattern is as above, with positive impacts in richer,
colder places and negative impacts in poorer, hot-
ter ones. Compared with the results above, there
is also variation within regions. This is not imme-
diately visible in Figure 5, but becomes apparent
below.
Measures of inequality
The Lorenz curve is a standard way to depict
income inequality. The Lorenz curve orders peo-
ple (or countries) by their (average) income and
plots cumulative income against cumulative num-
ber of people. For comparison, the Lorenz curve is
typically shown together with the curve for equal
income. The area between the two curve is the
numerator of the Gini coefficient, and the area
under the equal income curve is its denominator.
This works well for absolute quantities, but not for
changes, particularly if those changes can be posi-
dThe MATLAB code is on GitHub.
tive or negative. Figure 6 therefore shows an variant
of the Lorenz curve, here dubbed the Lorenz’ curve.
In the top left panel, I order people by their rela-
tive impact, with the highest positive impact first.
For comparison, I show the curve with equal rela-
tive impact.e ,f The two curves are far apart, high-
lighting the skewed distribution of the impacts of
climate change.
The top right panel of Figure 6 shows the Lorenz’
curve for the impact per income decile, the bottom
left panel per region, and the bottom right panel for
grid cells. For comparison, the Lorenz’ curve is also
shown for the cases in which the relative impact is
the same for all deciles, regions, or cells within their
countries. For deciles and regions, impact inequal-
ities between countries are larger than inequalities
within countries. Impact inequalities within coun-
tries do matter for grid cells.
Besides the graphical representation of inequali-
ties, I show four indicators. The first one is the Gini
coefficient
G = y¯
∑
c RcPc −
∑
c RcycPc
y¯
∑
c RcPc
(5)
e I also show the curve for equal absolute impact, which is
the straight line that people expect.
f If utility is the natural logarithm of per capita income,
equal relative impact on consumption implies equal abso-
lute impact on utility.
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Figure 6. The Lorenz’ curve of the economic impact of climate change for a 2.5 ◦Cwarming for countries (top left panel), income
deciles (top rights panel), states c.q. provinces (bottom left panel), and grid cells (bottom right panel).
where yc is the average income in country c, y¯ is the
global average income, Rc is the rank order of per
capita income of country c with Rc = 1 for the rich-
est country, and Pc is the size of the population
I also show the Theil-T index
TT = 1∑
c Pc
∑
c
Pc
yc
y¯
ln
yc
y¯
(6)
9Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. xxxx (2020) 1–13 © 2020 The Authors. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences published by Wiley Periodicals LLC
on behalf of New York Academy of Sciences
The distributional impact of climate change Tol
-1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
)rallod noillib( tcap
mi evitalu
mu
C
Cumulative population (million people)
Equal relative impact
Estimated impact, between countries
Estimated impact, within and between countries
-3000
-2000
-1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
)rallod noil lib( tc ap
mi  ev ital u
mu
C
Cumulative population (million people)
Equal relative impact
Estimated impact, between countries
Estimated impact, within and between countries
C
D
Figure 6. Continued
the Theil-L index
TL = 1∑
c Pc
∑
c
Pc ln
y¯
yc
(7)
and the Atkinson index (for an inequity aversion of
one)
A = 1 − 1
y¯
exp
(∑
c Pc ln yc∑
c Pc
)
(8)
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Table 1. Indicators of impact inequality
Scale Impact Gini′ Gini Theil-T Theil-L Atkinson
National None 0.621 0.934 1.035 0.645
Actual 0.106 0.630 0.967 1.090 0.664
Decile None 0.708 1.138 1.261 0.717
Average 0.426 0.717 1.170 1.316 0.732
Actual 0.447 0.718 1.176 1.325 0.734
Regional None 0.456 0.380 0.433 0.352
Average 0.419 0.473 0.410 0.469 0.375
Actual 0.459 0.473 0.412 0.472 0.376
Grid cell None 0.505 0.558 0.580 0.440
Average 0.197 0.509 0.589 0.613 0.458
Actual 1.126 0.517 0.612 0.635 0.470
aNote: The table shows the Gini′ coefficient (see Eq. 9 in text for explanation) of impact inequality and the Gini, Theil-T, Theil-L,
and Atkinson indicators of income inequality without (none) and with (actual) the impact of climate change. For income deciles and
regional impacts, results are shown for the estimated impact (“actual”) and the national average impact (“average”).
These indicators are calculated for current income,
and for current incomeminus the estimated impact
of climate change. For income deciles and regions,
I use the estimated impact as well as the average
impact for the country so as to assess the rela-
tive contributions of between- and within-country
variations.
I also compute something like the Gini coeffi-
cient for the impacts. The Gini coefficient is defined
as the area between equal income curve and the
Lorenz curve, divided by the area under the equal
income curve. The Gini coefficient therefore uses
a zero income as the worst case. As shown in
Figure 6, I use impact instead of income and thus
order from best to worst. The best case, however, is
not zero but positive. I therefore use the highest pos-
itive impact as the base, computing the area between
the equal relative impact and the highest positive
impact. Specifically,
G′ = I¯
∑
c rcycPc −
∑
c rcIcycPc
I¯
∑
c rcycPc + ICyC
∑
c Pc
(9)
where Ic is the relative impact of climate change in
country c and rc is its rank with rc = 1 denoting the
worst-off country and rc = C the best-off one. I call
this the Gini′ coefficient.
Table 1 shows the results. At the national level,
the impacts are not distributed equally and, as
the poorer are hit harder, worsen the income
distribution.
Changes in inequality indices are hard to inter-
pret. I therefore consider a hypothetical scenario:
everyone pays the same absolute tax, a poll tax.
The revenues are used to give everyone the same
relative income subsidy. This necessarily skews the
income distribution: the rich pay relatively little and
gain absolutely a lot, while the poor pay relatively
a lot and gain absolutely little. The tax and sub-
sidy makes everyone who earns less (more) than
the average $7611 per person per year worse (bet-
ter) off. I then find the tax and subsidy that change
the inequality indices by the same amount as cli-
mate change. For the national impact estimates,
the change in the Gini coefficient caused by cli-
mate change is equivalent to levying a poll tax of
$105 per person per year, and using the proceeds
to give everyone a subsidy of 1.4% of their income.
The poorest country in the sample is Burundi, with
an average income $151/person/year; the average
Burundian would lose $103 per year. Monaco is
the richest country; the average Monegasque earns
$160,228/year and would gain another $2138/year.
For the Theil-T index, tax and subsidy are about a
fifth higher, and for Theil-L and Atkinson about a
fifth lower.
The Gini′ coefficient for the impacts shows that
the distribution gets more uneven when we move
beyond country averages to consider the within-
country distribution. This is more pronounced for
the regions than for the income deciles, because the
regions vary in both climate and income. As above,
it is even starker for grid cells.
The indicators for income inequality by region or
decile show that the distribution of impacts between
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countries is more important than the distribution of
impacts within countries, as the indicators change
more when country-average impacts are used then
when decile- or region-specific impacts are used.
However, for the analysis on the grid cell level,
within-county variation is about as important as
between-country variation.
Discussion and conclusion
A meta-analysis of previously published estimates
of the economic impact of climate change shows
that poorer people in hotter places are more vul-
nerable to climate change. I use these insights to
downscale national impact estimates to income
deciles within countries, to subnational administra-
tive units, and to the grid. For themajority of people,
the impact of climate changewill beworse than their
country average. Between-country variation ismore
important than within-country variation, except for
the grid cell analysis in which they are about as
important.
There are several caveats to these results. First
and foremost, I rely heavily on imputation, extrap-
olating results for a course resolution to a fine
resolution. Primary estimates on fine social and
spatial scales are hard needed, be it for sectors (e.g.,
Refs. 53 and 54) or countries (e.g., Ref. 55). The
resolution needs to be fine. The urban heat island
effect, for instance, has a synergetic impact with
climate change11 but is less pronounced in wealthier
neighborhoods.56 I assume that differences between
countries can be interpolated to differences within
countries, even though differences within countries
are often smaller as because of a common legal
system, fiscal redistribution, and the shared pro-
vision of public goods. New regional estimates of
the economic impact of climate change would also
refine our estimates of the income elasticity and the
sensitivity of impacts to the current climate.
This paper confirms that the differences in vul-
nerability to climate change are profound. The
distribution of the impact of climate matters. Dif-
ferences in vulnerability between countries are
important because they affect the international
negotiations, through discussions on historical
responsibility and liability for impacts. Estimates
of impact differentials should also guide the alloca-
tion of development aid for adaptation to climate
change. The distribution of impacts also affects
optimal targets. The distribution of impacts within
countries should inform government decisions
about targeting adaptation and social programs
toward those who need them most.
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